Five days inside a decoy computer

What 1.4 million attempts look like when none of them work  ยท  27 October to 1 November 2026

For five days a decoy computer sat on the public internet, dressed up as a vulnerable server. It recorded 1,419,178 events. Nearly all of that was machines talking to machines, and none of it reached a real computer.

That is the job. A decoy takes the attention, records everything, and gives up nothing.

What is a honeypot?

A honeypot is a fake computer built to be attacked.

It looks genuine. There is a login screen, a file share, a website. Nothing behind any of it is real. Nobody is supposed to connect, so every connection is somebody who went looking for a way in.

Think of a shop where the shelves are empty and the staff are all cameras. There is no money in the till. Every person who tries the door gets filmed, and after a week you know exactly what the neighbourhood is like.

The numbers that matter

1.4Mevents recorded
14,438different addresses
40countries seen
5.1days watched
3.2events per second
0real computers touched

How far did anyone get?

This is the part that matters. The numbers get very small, very fast.

1 in 22reached a working service
1,419,178 → 63,492
1 in 31became an actual login attempt
63,492 → 2,029
1 in 36got a password accepted
2,029 → 57

Over 5.1 days the decoy logged about 3.2 events every second. Only 63,492 of those involved somebody reaching a working service rather than just knocking at the door. That is 4%. Each row is its own small picture. The squares split that row's total evenly, and the orange one marks the share that got through. Every step gets its own scale, so nothing is too small to see.

Was it people?

About 38% of the traffic came from companies whose business is scanning the internet. Security research firms, mostly, plus search engines that index connected devices. Most of the rest came from rented servers, many of them already compromised and running cheap automated tools.

A person at a keyboard is a rare event in this dataset.

Where the traffic came from

Attacks per day

The first and last days are only partly covered. The decoy was switched on late on 27 October and off early on 1 November, so those bars are shorter for that reason rather than because activity dropped.

What were they looking for?

The same handful of front doors, over and over. These are the services that cause the most damage when they are left exposed, which is why they are the ones being tried.

These counts include every knock at the door, not only the connections that got through, so they run far larger than the numbers in the funnel above.

Where did they come from?

Addresses from 40 countries turn up in the data. The United States leads the count, and the reason is dull: the biggest commercial scanning firms are based there. Nothing in the pattern points at you. This is the background noise that every public machine receives.

Three that made a real effort

Most of this is noise. These three were working at something.

1. Hammering remote desktop

One address opened 4,314 remote-desktop sessions in six hours, roughly one every five seconds, straight through the night. That is a password list being worked through from end to end.

2. Trying the same passwords as everyone else

The usernames were sa, admin and root. The passwords were blank, 123, password and admin. A blank password was tried 624 times. Every one of those appears in every published password dump, so a login using one is standing open.

3. Asking the server for its cloud account keys

This is the one that would have hurt. Attackers asked the decoy for the credentials it uses to talk to its cloud provider, the digital keys to the whole account. That trick turns a small website bug into control of everything you run online.

Four programs that nearly ran

On four occasions between 28 October and 1 November, somebody got far enough to upload and start a program. Every one was a cryptocurrency miner or the tool that hides one.

Romania

A program built to hide itself, 1.6 MB

Logged in as root with the password password

Pakistan · Hamdard University, Karachi

A cryptocurrency miner, 28.8 MB

Logged in as root with the password debian

China

A cryptocurrency miner, 864.0 KB

Logged in as root with the password debian

United States

A cryptocurrency miner, 28.3 MB

Logged in as root with the password debian

The whole trick was one password

Three of the four typed root with the password debian. The fourth used root with password. Four different operators in three countries, and the same two guesses. That is a botnet at work: it knocks, guesses the default, drops a miner, disconnects and moves to the next address.

None of it ran on a real computer. The decoy accepted the upload, recorded it, and stopped there.

What would have happened if it were real?

Entry pointAttempts seenWhat it would have meant
Windows file sharing211,163Ransomware spreading machine to machine across an office, encrypting everything it reaches.
Websites40,576A defaced site, a hidden back door, or a stolen customer database.
Remote desktop93,440Somebody sitting at your computer with your permissions, reading files and locking you out.
Remote login (SSH)40,424Full control of that machine, usually to add it to a network of hijacked computers.
Old telnet login19,343Command-line control over equipment that was never meant to face the internet.
Databases15,630Everything inside copied out, often with no sign it happened.
Cloud account keys790Control of your entire cloud account: data, backups and billing.

What to take away from this

Words used above

Honeypot
A decoy computer designed to attract and record attacks.
Port
A numbered doorway on a computer. Different services listen on different doorways: 443 for websites, 3389 for remote desktop.
Scanner
An automated program that visits every address on the internet to see what answers.
Remote desktop (RDP)
A Windows feature for controlling a computer over the network. Useful, and therefore frequently attacked.
Brute force
Guessing passwords by trying many in a row, very quickly.
Cloud keys
The credentials a server uses to act on your behalf in a cloud account. Whoever holds them effectively owns the account.